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In 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in China, ultimately 
causing the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pan-
demic. Many persons with SARS-CoV-2 infection have 
since flown into and out of COVID-19–affected areas 
(1). Some countries quarantine arriving passengers. 
Airports are also screening passenger body tempera-
tures before boarding and after arrival. Recent inves-
tigations have shown that SARS-CoV-2 can be trans-
mitted before symptom onset, posing a challenge to 
outbreak control (2). Although risks for SARS-CoV-2 
transmission have been extensively investigated, in-
flight transmission of the virus has not been formally 
confirmed. Airline staff members have voiced con-
cerns over acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 infection (3). 
Given that flights are still departing to and from CO-
VID-19–affected countries, determining whether in-
flight transmission of SARS-CoV-2 occurs is essential.
The Study
We examined public records for 1,110 persons with 
laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 in Hong Kong, Chi-
na, recorded from January 23 through June 13, 2020; 
we used Centre for Health Protection (CHP) public re-
cords and the Vote4HK COVID-19 in HK database for 
case-patients who had traveled before diagnosis (4,5). 
At the time, the Hong Kong government had yet to 
introduce mandatory quarantine and airport screen-
ing (6). We identified a cluster of 4 persons with CO-
VID-19 (henceforth referred to as patients A–D) as-
sociated with a commercial flight that departed from 
Boston, Massachusetts, USA, on March 9 and arrived 
in Hong Kong on March 10, 2020. The airplane, a Boe-
ing 777-300ER, flew for ≈15 hours and carried a maxi-
mum of 294 passengers. The cluster comprised 2 pas-
sengers and 2 cabin crew members. Although these 
persons did not fulfill the criteria for SARS-CoV-2 
testing at the time of arrival, results of reverse tran-
scription PCR conducted in local healthcare settings 
within 5–11 days of arrival were positive. All 4 case-
patients subsequently recovered (Appendix Figure 
1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/26/11/20-
3254-App1.pdf).
Patients A and B were a married couple. Patient A 
was a 58-year-old man with underlying disease who 
sat in a window seat in business class on the airplane 
(Appendix Figure 2). On March 10, fever and pro-
ductive cough developed; on March 13, he had mild 
abdominal discomfort, followed by diarrhea 2 days 
later. His 61-year-old wife, patient B, also had under-
lying illness. She sat directly in front of him in a busi-
ness class window seat. On March 10, she had a sore 
throat. One day later, fever and cough developed. 
As their symptoms evolved, they sought healthcare 
and were hospitalized on March 14. On March 15, re-
spiratory samples (collected March 14 for patient A 
and March 15 for patient B) were positive for SARS-
CoV-2. No public record indicates what their under-
lying diseases were or whether these 2 passengers 
were symptomatic during the flight. Before the flight 
and within the 14-day incubation period, they visited 
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Four persons with severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 infection had traveled on the same flight from Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, USA, to Hong Kong, China. Their virus 
genetic sequences are identical, unique, and belong to a 
clade not previously identified in Hong Kong, which strongly 
suggests that the virus can be transmitted during air travel.
In-Flight Transmission of SARS-CoV-2
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (February 15–March 2); 
New York, New York, USA (March 2–5); and Boston 
(March 5–9). CHP classified the couple as imported 
cases into Hong Kong.
Patient C was an asymptomatic 25-year-old man 
identified through contact tracing by the Hong Kong 
government and the airline as a close contact of pa-
tients A and B. He was a Hong Kong–based busi-
ness class flight attendant who served patients A and 
B during the flight. After patients A and B received 
their diagnoses, the airline informed patient C, and 
he attended an outpatient clinic on March 16. He 
was positive for SARS-CoV-2 on March 17 and was 
subsequently quarantined and hospitalized. Patient 
C stayed in Boston during March 5–9. Patient D was 
a 51-year-old female Hong Kong–based flight atten-
dant on the same flight. Fever and cough developed 
on March 18, SARS-CoV-2 test result was positive on 
March 21, and patient D was hospitalized. There is 
no publicly available information of her travel history 
before the flight or her contacts with the other pa-
tients on or after the flight. Descriptions of the disease 
experienced by patients C and D were unavailable. 
CHP categorized patients C and D as close contacts of 
a person with an imported case.
To generate genetic evidence for transmission 
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Figure. Phylogenetic tree of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) viruses isolated from passengers 
and airline crew members who traveled on the same flight from Boston, Massachusetts, USA, to Hong Kong, China. Human SARS-
CoV-2 WIV04 is selected to be the root of this phylogenetic tree. The tree was constructed by using the neighbor-joining method. Only 
bootstrap values >80 are shown. Representative viruses from clades L, S, V, G, GH, GR, and O (others) are included in the analysis. 
Virus sequences from patients A–D reported in this study are grouped to clade G (GISAID [http://platform.gisaid.org] accession nos. 
EPI_ISL_476801 to EPI_ISL_476804). EPI ISL accession nos. for sequences retrieved in GISAID (http://platform.gisaid.org) are 
provided. Scale bar indicates estimated genetic distance.
DISPATCHES
between the 4 patients, we sequenced their viruses. 
Samples were collected under public health author-
ity, and individual patient identities are known to 
CHP. Retrospective analysis of leftover samples 
without individual consent was permitted under lo-
cal regulations and approved by the institutional re-
view board of the University of Hong Kong/Hospital 
Authority West Cluster (reference UW 20-168) and 
the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Ethics Committee (reference 22384). Stored upper re-
spiratory samples were sent to a World Health Or-
ganization reference laboratory at the University of 
Hong Kong. We deduced near full-length genomes 
(sequence length >29,760 nt) by using the Illumina se-
quencing method and previously described primers 
and protocol (7). All deduced sequences had a mini-
mum coverage of 100. While sequencing and analyz-
ing the specimens, we were blinded to patient status 
as passenger or crew.
The near full-length viral genomes from all 4 
patients were 100% identical and phylogenetically 
grouped to clade G (Figure). Other than these 4, none 
of the 189 viral sequences deduced from samples 
collected in Hong Kong (January 21–May 12, 2020; 
GISAID, http://platform.gisaid.org), belong to this 
clade (data not shown) (K.S. Leung et al., unpub. data, 
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.
03.30.20045740v2). Conversely, in March 2020, virus 
sequences related to those of patients A–D with only 
2 nt differences were isolated in Toronto, New York 
City, and Massachusetts (Table), making it plausible 
that patients A and B acquired a similar virus dur-
ing their visit. Worldwide during January 10–June 13, 
≈30,000 complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes with high 
coverage were deposited into the GISAID database. 
None shares 100% identity with the sequences of the 
viruses in the cluster reported here.
Conclusions
Given the case histories and sequencing results, the 
most likely sequence of events is that one or both 
of passengers A and B contracted SARS-CoV-2 in 
North America and transmitted the virus to flight 
attendants C and D during the flight. The only loca-
tion where all 4 persons were in close proximity for 
an extended period was inside the airplane. Passen-
gers and cabin crew do not generally go through the 
same check-in process at airports before boarding. Al-
though we cannot completely rule out the possibility 
that patients C and D were infected before boarding, 
the unique virus sequence and 100% identity across 
the whole virus genome from the 4 patients makes 
this scenario highly unlikely. Patient D may have ac-
quired infection from patient C, but because their test 
results were positive within 1 incubation period, it is 
more likely that patient D was infected by patient A 
or B. We therefore conclude that these 4 patients be-
long to the same in-flight transmission chain.
Our results strongly suggest in-flight transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV-2. No other COVID-19 cases asso-
ciated with this flight have been identified. We were 
unable to quantify the virus attack rate on this flight 
because not all passengers were tested.
Previous reports of probable in-flight transmis-
sions of SARS-CoV-2 lack genetic evidence (8,9). 
During January–March 2020, the International Air 
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Table. Single nucleotide polymorphisms in the SARS-CoV-2 virus sequences from 4 patients on the same flight from Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA, to Hong Kong, China* 
GISAID 
accession no. Source 
Sample 
collection date 
Nucleotide positions† Nucleotide 
difference‡ 241 3037 9857 11083 14408 23403 
402124 Reference sequence WIV04† 2019 Dec 30 C C C G C A 6 
476802 Patient A 2020 Mar 14 T T T T§ T¶ G# 0 
476801 Patient B 2020 Mar 15 T T T T§ T¶ G# 0 
476803 Patient C 2020 Mar 17 T T T T§ T¶ G# 0 
476804 Patient D 2020 Mar 19 T T T T§ T¶ G# 0 
460471 Massachusetts, USA 2020 Mar 27 T T C G T¶ G# 2 
427528 New York, USA 2020 Mar 12 T T C G T¶ G# 2 
418354 Ontario, Canada 2020 Mar 15 T T C G T¶ G# 2 
*These 4 viral genomes are unique among the sequences deposited into the GISAID database (http://platform.gisaid.org) January 10–June 13, 2020. 
They contain 6 polymorphisms compared with the WIV04 reference sequence of SARS-CoV-2, 3 of which are nonconservative. SARS-CoV-2 genomes 
that differ from these by 2 nt had been reported from Massachusetts, USA; New York, USA; and Ontario, Canada, in March 2020. SARS-CoV-2, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. 
†A 2019 reference sequence from a patient in Wuhan, China (hCoV-19/Wuhan/WIV04/2019). The nucleotide positions shown are relative to this 
reference sequence (GISAID accession ID EPL_ISL_402124). 
‡No. nucleotide differences relative to the virus genomes of patients A–D. 
§Nonconservative polymorphism at nucleotide position 11083, which corresponds to a Leu (TTG) to Phe (TTT), L37F, amino acid change in the NSP6 
protein. 
¶Nonconservative polymorphism at nucleotide position 14408, which corresponds to a Pro (CCT) to Leu (CTT), P323L, amino acid change in the NSP12 
protein. 
#Nonconservative polymorphism at nucleotide position 23403, which corresponds to an Asp (GAT) to Gly (GGT), D614G, amino acid change in the spike 
protein. 
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Transport Association received 3 reports of suspected 
in-flight transmission (10). Contact tracing of 2 pas-
sengers who flew from China to Canada has yielded 
no indication of secondary infections from the flight 
(11). Nonetheless, SARS-CoV-2 test results have been 
positive for hundreds of flight attendants and pilots; 
at least 2 have died (12,13). Our results demonstrate 
that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted on airplanes. To 
prevent transmission of the virus during travel, infec-
tion control measures must continue.
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